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Abstract
Many realist writings exemplify the spirit of ‘recipe realism’. Here I
characterise recipe realism, challenge it, and propose replacing it with
‘exemplar realism’. This alternative understanding of realism is more
piecemeal, robust, and better in tune with scientists’ own attitude
towards their best theories, and thus to be preferred.
1 Introduction
Alice: Hofstadter’s 40-year old prediction of the butterfly spectrum of elec-
trons energy in a magnetic field was just confirmed!
Bob: Wow! Realism about quantum mechanics further vindicated!
Alice: But we’ve been here before, no? The possibility of impressive predic-
tions from radically mistaken premises. Remember the ether models of
light. Underdetermination, and all that!
Bob: Well, I am a structural realist! There is a structural correspondence
between successful ether models and Maxwell’s theory, and probably
one in any actual example of underdetermination.
Alice: So, given any predictively successful, mature theory, you bet it gets
‘the structure’ right?
Bob: Yup. And by ‘structure’ I mean. . .Well, take the Ramsey-sentence of
a theory, and . . .
Conversations of this kind have echoed widely in the recent philosophy
of science. Never mind Bob’s structural realist stripe. What should strike
you worrisome is how readily Bob attests to particular realist commitments,
without any need to consider the further details concerning the theoretical
prediction in question. It is as if Bob had an abstract realist recipe in his
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sleeve, capable of distilling the trustworthy aspects of a theory, applicable
to any good, predictively successful mature theory.
Bob is a recipe realist. Many contemporary realists are like Bob: they
readily declare their epistemological commitments in the abstract, recipe
like, regarding all/most/many theories in mature science, on the basis of few
detailed exemplars that are meant to motivate and illustrate their favourite
recipe. But even the most closely studies exemplars are open to a wide range
of interpretation; consequently there are almost as many recipes as there
are recipe realists. Understandably there are quarrels over the best recipe,
but recipe realists—unified in their spirit—vehemently oppose anti-realists
who claim that recipe realism should be given up altogether, in favour of
empiricism or instrumentalism.
I have no truck with the anti-realist side of the debate, but I think recipe
realism is deeply flawed. It is flawed in its spirit, not just in the letter of this
or that particular recipe. In this paper I aim to characterise recipe realism,
challenge it, and propose replacing it with (what I here call) exemplar real-
ism. This alternative understanding of realism is more piecemeal, robust,
and better in tune with scientists’ own attitude towards their best theories,
and thus to be preferred.1
2 Debates about recipe realism
There is a battery of familiar challenges to scientific realism regarding well-
confirmed theories that are thoroughly accepted by scientists. Some turn
on evidence from the history of science against the realist notion that we
can have good scientific evidence for the ‘approximate’ or ‘partial’ truth of
our current best theories (or something like that). This challenge effectively
arises out of inconsistency between past and current science. Other (perhaps
less familiar) challenges arise out of other inconsistencies in science: intern-
ally inconsistent models, for example, or the indispensable use idealisations
that are radically at odds with our background beliefs.
Realist responses to these challenges are equally familiar. According to
these responses the inconsistencies above are compatible with the kind of
continuity or correspondence that a suitably modest realism requires. The
intended sense of continuity or correspondence is signalled by the familiar
realist monikers (such as ‘structural realism’ or ‘entity realism’). Specifying
the precise sense of continuity or correspondence is tricky, and there is much
divergence in the details of different realist responses. For example, the sense
of structural continuity associated with dispositional semi-realism is quite
different from that of Ramsey-sentence structuralism. But while the various
1This ‘big picture’ paper can merely sketch this alternative vision of realism, leaving
many of the details to be developed elsewhere. See Saatsi (forthcoming a, b) for related
discussion.
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realist responses are multifarious in their letter, they are broadly unified
in their spirit: by and large, realists have aimed to provide a recipe for
characterising the truth-content of our current theories (or, more broadly,
characterising a uniform sense in which well-confirmed theories ‘latch onto’
unobservable reality).
There is much debate within the realist camp regarding, say, the most
appropriate formal framework for characterising realist commitments. There
are broad-ranging debates about how to best understand the notion of ‘struc-
ture’, for example, and how it differs from the ‘nature’ of unobservable entit-
ies (if at all). But these debates regarding the letter of the realist response
should not hide the considerable underlying unity in the spirit of the over-
all realist endeavour: realists by and large agree that it is meaningful and
worthwhile to aim to delineate our epistemic commitments in the abstract,
largely independently of case-specific details, resulting in a recipe (or two)
projectable both to future science and well beyond the selected case-studies
that arguably fit the recipe.
The spirit of recipe realism is prevalent in the realism debate, on both
sides of the debate. It shows in the way the realists and anti-realists alike
go looking for cases from the history of science to test (or ‘falsify’) partic-
ular realist recipes, for example. For instance, Stanford (2003) argues in
this way against Worrall’s structural realism on the basis of a problematic
case from the history of biology: arguably the mathematical structure ex-
pressed by Galton’s Ancestral Law of his “stirp” theory of inheritance—the
driver of the theory’s predictive success—is not preserved in contempor-
ary genetics. Theories of inheritance bear little resemblance to the cases
(from physics) that have motivated structural realism in the first place, but
Stanford’s dialectic makes perfect sense if we construe structural realism as
purportedly offering a general recipe that applies across the sciences. And—
to be fair—Worrall’s (1989) discussion of structural realism is fully general
in its tone, despite primarily drawing motivation from ‘revolutionary’ theory
shifts in physics. In Worrall’s words, structural realism aims to ‘to give the
[anti-realist] argument from scientific revolutions its full weight and yet still
adopt some sort of realist attitude towards presently accepted theories in
physics and elsewhere.’ (p. 99, my emphasis) Similarly, later structural real-
ists have presented their epistemic credo (‘all the we know is structure’) in
very general terms (see e.g. French, 2014; Ladyman et al. 2007). Structural
realists have advocated recipe realism, and amongst these realists the debate
has mostly revolved around the letter of the best structuralist recipe. Is the
recipe that delineates the structuralist’s epistemic commitments in the ab-
stract best expressed in terms of a theory’s Ramsey-sentence? In terms of
partial structures? In modal terms? Anti-realists like Stanford, on the other
hand, who have grown skeptical of the whole recipe realist endeavour, see
the ‘falsification’ of this or that realist recipe as a motivation for abandoning
realism altogether in favour of neo-instrumentalism, say. For if it looks like
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there are ‘counterexamples’ to be found to any realist-recipe, what becomes
of the hope to find a recipe worthy of realist commitment?
Some of the most recent realist writings also exemplify the spirit of re-
cipe realism.2 Consider first Vickers (2013) who is concerned with particular
derivations of successful predictions. What epistemic attitude should we ad-
opt towards derivations of successful predictions, given that the history of
science shows (in various ways) how successful predictions can be derived
from clearly mistaken premises? In response to this question Vickers pro-
poses ‘a new “recipe” for the prospective identification of (at least some)
working/idle posits’ (p. 189). After some twists and turns Vickers ulti-
mately arrives at a modest conclusion that nevertheless expresses the spirit
of recipe realism: ‘Even if the “working posits” of contemporary science can-
not be prospectively identified, it remains possible that we might develop a
recipe for identifying certain idle posits.’ (p. 209)
Or consider Peters (2014) who is concerned not with particular deriv-
ations of successful predictions, but with the predictive success of a given
(unifying) theory. Peters first sensibly distances his realist brief from the
kinds of recipes (like structural realism) that ‘regard a particular type of
theoretical element [such as ‘mathematical structure’] as having a special
explanatory role’ for the realist.3 But then, in offering his own ‘unification
account’, Peters still ambitiously aims to provide a general, prospectively
applicable recipe—Peters calls it ‘algorithm’—for identifying the elements
of successful scientific theories that we can selectively be realists about.
Roughly speaking, the recipe that Peters has in mind with his ‘empirically
successful subtheory account’ turns on the idea that empirical success ap-
propriately understood requires a certain kind of unification that ‘does not
justify regarding entire theories as confirmed but rather provides a [recipe]
for picking out the confirmed elements within theories’ (p. 390).
Stepping back from these examples of recipe realism, we can characterise
the overall realist endeavour exemplified therein as aiming to pin down a
perspective on science that is sweeping and monolithic in its realist outlook.
The aim is to capture theories’ epistemic commitments across a wide range of
disciplines and different areas of scientific theorising in unified terms, offering
2Since the details of the positions reported here do not matter for my argument I will
leave them aside.
3To this extent Peters’s comments are a very much in line with my criticism of recipe
realism below (§3).
The first major objection to special accounts is that they are motivated by
particular cases or types of cases that are not necessarily representative. We
might concede that the mathematical structural realist and the phenomen-
ological realist have successfully identified those theoretical elements that
are intuitively essential to the Fresnel wave theory of light and the London
model of superconductivity, respectively. And yet we can, and should, deny
that similar analyses can be applied more generally. (p. 382)
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recipes or algorithms that are first motivated by particular considerations
and case-studies, and then optimistically projected well beyond those to the
rest of science. Those who prefer a recipe of a different flavour can challenge
those projections on the basis of this or that case that does not seem to fit the
recipe on offer. Anti-realists go further in taking the seeming proliferation
of increasingly weaker realist recipes to signal the need to give up on realism
altogether in favour of instrumentalism (e.g. Stanford 2003).
Before I go on to challenge the spirit of recipe realism it is worth pausing
to note that the prevalence of this spirit in the realism debate is far from
surprising in the light of the debate’s intellectual history. There is a long
tradition to framing scientific realism in very global terms, as a philosophical
theory about ‘mature science’. As Putnam (1979) had it, for example, para-
phrasing Boyd (1973), realism is a broad empirical hypothesis according to
which ‘terms in a mature science typically refer’, and ‘the laws of a theory
belonging to a mature science are typically approximately true’. (p. 290)
Over the 1980s and 90s, largely in reaction to Laudan’s historical attack of
realism, there has been gradual weakening of the sense of ‘approximation’
at stake. But realists have by and large maintained their global aspirations
and the idea that realism is an explanatory theory about ‘mature science’.
3 Challenging recipe realism
I hold a broadly realist outlook on science, but I also agree with those who
deem the debates on recipe realist stale and degenerative. Instead of enga-
ging those debates we can challenge the spirit of recipe realism altogether,
making room for a realist endeavour of a different sort. Here are some
reasons for doing this.
Diversity of science. In the face of the impressive diversity of science it
is hard to think of a prima facie reason to expect that one or two realist
recipes could fit all (or even most) of predictively successful mature sci-
ence. Scientific theorising on the whole is rather inhomogeneous in its key
aspects vis-à-vis the realism issue. Have a look at the kinds of explana-
tions that are accepted in different areas of science, from particle cosmology
to molecular biology, from systems biology to geology, and so on. Have a
look at the kinds of theoretical reasoning that are successfully employed in
connection with different research traditions, from gauge theories in funda-
mental physics to immunology, from climate science to evolutionary biology.
Even within a single discipline one can find radically different modes of ex-
planation and theoretical reasoning in play. Why think that we are apt to
latch onto reality in the same way throughout the sciences, or even within
a single discipline? Quite plausibly, some areas of science are more likely
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to exhibit underdetermination than others.4 Some subject matters are very
far removed from everyday reality (e.g. quantum fields), while others are
relative close to it despite being about thoroughly unobservable entities and
processes (e.g. causal-mechanistic systems in microbiology). In the face of
all the diversity, why think that one (or even a handful) of recipes uniformly
and fairly captures—across the board—the way in which theories’ empirical
success is correlated with the way they latch onto reality?
Recipe realists are prone to abstracting away from real-life differences
in science—in how explanatory and other kinds of theoretical virtues are
judged, for example—in motivating their recipes. At a high enough level of
abstraction all scientific theorising looks homogeneous, as when abstractly
described as simply relying on the method of ‘inference to the best explana-
tion’, the reliability of which has then become a central bone of contention.
The realist idea that we can thus argue for wholesale realism, as an ab-
ductively justifiable theory about all of mature science, was a bad one. In
the light of the various criticisms of global justification of inference to the
best explanation through the No-Miracles Argument, there is no reason to
think that the intuition underlying the argument, motivating a broad realist
outlook on science, would thus undergird recipe realism. (See in particular
Saatsi (forthcoming a) and Frost-Arnold, 2010.)
Varieties of realist explanations. One need not advocate recipe realism
in order respect the intuition that the overall empirical success of science is
(by and large) due to—and hence in some sense explained by—our theories
latching better and better onto reality. This is because this intuition is
respected even better with pluralism about the different ways in which a
theory can be at the same time radically mistaken in some of its assumptions,
yet empirically successful by virtue of suitably ‘latching onto reality’. The
various illustrations of different realist recipes function as exemplars of this,
of course, showing how empirical success can be due to getting ‘structure’
right, getting right some of a system’s less-specific features, getting right
the fundamental causal contributors, and so on. Instead of thinking that
different recipe proposals are in competition for the ‘one true recipe’, think
of them as exploring this possibility space. Each recipe may fit a limited
number of specific cases, furnishing realist explanations of empirical success
(with respect to specific instances of predictive success, say) to the tune of
the ‘no-miracles’ intuition. But all that of course provides no reason to think
that those recipes should be projected across the board, and that the other
possibilities are not realized somewhere else in science.
4See e.g. Smeenk (2013) and Butterfield (2012) on underdetermination in cosmology,
and Belot (2014) on underdetermination in geology.
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Contentless recipes. In effort to accommodate a variety of cases a recipe
realist can describe her recipe in increasingly abstract and general terms.
But the more abstract and generic a recipe becomes, the less work it can
do for the realist in providing a clear sense of how we are meant to regard
our theories latching onto reality. Stanford (2003) rightly complains that
all realist attempts to pin down a general recipe seem to have resulted in
a characterisation of epistemic commitments so vague and ill-defined as to
deflate the realists claim to be able to trust in our current theories in the
sense given by the recipe. For Stanford this challenge is (part of) his ‘trust
argument’: in presenting a recipe for stating their epistemic commitment
in a way that is compatible with various different kinds of theory-shifts
in the history of science the realist is forced to ‘defend realist inferential
entitlements that are so weak as to capitulate to the realist’s opponent on
the question of whether we can safely trust the accounts of nature given by
current or future successful scientific theories’ (2003, p. 572).
There are indeed serious difficulties for the realist to pin down precise
‘content’ of their recipe (to spell out what ‘structure’, for example, amounts
to).5 It is difficult, first of all, to come up with a well-motivated general
recipe in the abstract, without concrete exemplars. Consider the different
attempts to characterise structural content in terms of Ramsey-sentences or
the ‘semantic view’ of theories, for example, in a way that is detached from
actual scientific cases. (See e.g. Cruse and Papineau, 2002; Ladyman, 1998.)
It is entirely unclear why these recipes should in general be at all good for
discerning something that will be carried over in various theory changes,
something that furthermore genuinely accounts for the past theories’ em-
pirical success. (See Saatsi, 2012.) Often recipes are not just defended in
the abstract, but along with illustrative exemplars that motivate the recipe
and give some concrete content to it (e.g. Worrall (1989) on Fresnel’s ether
theory, and Ladyman (2011) on phlogiston). The problem with this use of
exemplars, however, is that different exemplars pull in different directions,
ultimately watering down the recipe’s content. If by ‘structure’ we mean
whatever is common to the Fresnel case, and the phlogiston case, and all
the other cases that recipe realist imperialistically wishes to accommodate,
then structure as the ‘common denominator’ threatens to become so vague
(or disjunctive) that the recipe fails to pin down realist commitments in the
way it is purportedly meant to do. All in all, recipe realism can at best
be bought for the price of an unacceptable degree of ambiguity in realist
commitments.
If one thinks that scientific realism must be recipe realism, then so much
worse for scientific realism. This is what Stanford’s (2003) ‘trust argu-
5An optimist may say that this only shows that the recipe is complex and difficult to
figure out. I think it is more realistic to regard the whole programme of recipe realism as
a degenerating one.
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ment’ concludes, having first demanded that realists absolutely should offer
a recipe that could be reliably applied ‘prospectively—in advance of future
developments—to identify the idle features or components of scientific the-
ories.’ (p. 915) Stanford argues that we if cannot invent and defend a recipe
that allows us to clearly identify trust-worthy aspects of our current theor-
ies, then instrumentalism is in the offing. As I will next explain, this is not
so; realism without recipes is still realism enough.6
4 Realism through exemplars
Recipe realists are right in leaning heavily on exemplars in explicating their
realist commitments, but they go wrong in trying to generate a general
recipe that captures the gist of those exemplars. In order to bring out
the contrast between my realist inclinations and recipe realism it is worth
reflecting further on the notion of ‘realism’ itself.
Realism is often construed as a naturalistic philosophical (and sometimes
quasi-scientific) theory. As a theory about science, realism is broadly speak-
ing explanatory vis-à-vis the empirical success of science, for example, and
it is also broadly speaking predictive, by virtue of offering a prospectively
applicable algorithm for discerning belief-worthy parts or aspects of our cur-
rent science. As a unified theory about science it is meant to be testable
by data from the historical record and our best understanding of science.
(Hence the fairly common talk of counterexamples that ‘falsify’ realism.)
That is how recipe realists construe ‘realism’. I prefer to think of realism
as the adoption of a certain positive attitude towards science (as opposed
to acceptance of a realist theory about science).7 One’s belief in realism,
then, amounts to believing the general appropriateness of this attitude.8
The realist attitude is not a theory or recipe, but rather an adherence to the
No Miracles intuition according to which the impressive empirical success
of science is by and large down to theories latching onto reality in ways
that make them empirically successful. The idea that this is a reasonable
attitude towards science says nothing in and of itself about where exactly
we should place our trust in science; it says nothing about exactly what
there is in the world; and so on. But by maintaining this attitude, and
acting accordingly in trying to figure out how old theories are related to
newer ones, how idealisations work, and so on, one is operating in a realist
spirit by virtue of adhering to the quintessentially realist notion that overall
6See also Saatsi (forthcoming a) for further discussion of Stanford’s argument in the
broader context of ‘pessimistic inductions’ against realism.
7My distinction between theory and attitude may have connotations of van Fraassen’s
(2002) distinction between factual beliefs and epistemic stances. Examining the relation-
ship between these distinctions calls for further work.
8The statement ‘realism is correct’ is a claim not about directly about science; it is
meta-level claim about the realist attitude, which itself concerns science.
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empirical success (and in particular predictive success) of science is a matter
of science progressively latching better and better onto unobservable reality.
As a global attitude towards science, scientific realism thus construed
has little epistemic content in and of itself. A realist gains her epistemic
commitments when she applies her realist attitude locally, in a piecemeal
way, to particular theories in particular disciplines and domains of science.
Only these further steps will allow her to say something epistemologically
committing about the various ways in which we can expect specific theories
to latch onto reality. This is where the exemplars come in. They provide
cognitive content to claims of the following sort: in a domain of science like
this, with theories or models like that, empirical success in this sense, is
(probably) accountable in those terms (even if these theories or models are
radically mistaken ‘on the whole’). In order to fill in the underscored place-
holders above a realist can consult the (scientific) experts for the fullness of
relevant detail, instead of pretending to be able to figure out the answer from
the philosophical armchair. She might focus on the shift from ether theor-
ies to Maxwell, for example, and on the successful derivation of Fresnel’s
equations more specifically, and fill in the blanks by drawing on our best
overall historico-scientific understanding of what made Fresnel’s derivations
tick. This exemplar, and many others, can concern historical theory-shifts;
others can concern idealised, or internally inconsistent models, for example.
The more exemplars she explores, the better grasp she gets of the epistemic
commitments that her realist attitude ensues.
By way of analogy, consider our commitment to try to account for bio-
logical phenomena from an evolutionary perspective. This commitment, as
captured by Theodosius Dobzhansky’s famous phrase ‘Nothing in biology
makes sense except in the light of evolution’, expresses an attitude towards
our overall understanding of the living world, not a theory about it. Even
if one did not have any first-order evidence positively supporting the appro-
priateness of this attitude, one could take it as a starting point, and defend
it in a piecemeal way against anti-evolutionary attacks. The defence varies
in detail from case to case: from the accusation that the evolutionary per-
spective is incompatible with the complexity of flagella, to the claim that it
is incompatible with our consciousness, and so on.
Notwithstanding the obvious weaknesses of this analogy, we can similarly
start by adopting a broad realist attitude towards science: the impressive
success of science, overall, does not make sense except in the light of the idea
that science is latching better and better onto unobservable reality. We can
then go about defending this attitude against anti-realist attacks. Again, the
details of the realist defence will vary from case to case: from the claim that
the realist perspective is incompatible with the success of Newtonian physics,
to the claim that it is incompatible with the success of Fresnel’s physics, to
the charge that it is in tension with our most fundamental theories being
mutually incompatible, and so on. Different instances of the realist defence
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can rely on different senses of ‘latching onto reality’, and the case-dependent
details function as exemplars that help us think about other cases that are
relevantly similar to these exemplars.
Let me sum up this brief sketch of exemplar-based realism as follows. In
his state-of-the-art review of scientific realism, Chakravartty (2011) begins
by summarising scientific realism as ‘a positive epistemic attitude towards
the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both
observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences.’
(My emphasis.) In my view Chakravartty is exactly right in characterising
realism as ‘a positive epistemic attitude’, but realism need not make any
kind of blanket recommendation regarding what our theories say about the
unobservable aspects of world. Instead of this, the positive attitude of ex-
emplar realism recommends only adherence to the idea that by and large
theories achieve their empirical success by virtue of getting something right
about the unobservable world. Specific exemplars then give cognitive con-
tent to what this ‘by virtue of’ relation stands for, varying from case to case,
with limited projectability to cases relevantly similar to those exemplars.
5 Challenges to exemplar realism?
Realism as a global meta-level attitude does not come with a prospectively
applicable recipe for delineating realist commitments. The only forward-
looking aspect of realism is associated with the exemplars: an exemplar
realist account of the empirical success of an ether model of light, for ex-
ample, will provide an understanding of how models of that kind can be
predictively successful in those ways (even if the model harbours mistaken
assumptions). As is always the case with exemplars, their application is
based on (fallible) judgements of relevant similarity. This is a relatively
‘local’ matter. An exemplar from optics is unlikely to be of any use with
respect to geology, say, and a realist account of the empirical success of
Newtonian gravity, for example, only relates to theorising that is suitably
similar to this exemplar, viz. gravity and dynamics in fundamental physics.
This piecemeal spirit of exemplar realism goes against the commonly held
idea that realism requires the provision of a prospectively applicable abstract
recipe for capturing realist commitments for any given theory. Anti-realists
present this as a challenge: if realism does not provide a prospectively ap-
plicable recipe, then how do we know what parts or aspects of our current
science we can trust? (See Stanford, 2003.) In response I maintain that
the idea of a prospectively applicable realist recipe is an empty hope. It is
a manifestation of philosophical arrogance to think that as a realist philo-
sopher one commits oneself to providing a global recipe—largely independ-
ently of the science steeped in relevant details—for revealing what aspects
of theory-world correspondence makes any given theory in mature science
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tick. A much more reasonable and realistic aim for the realist is to be able
to point to a range of exemplars to elucidate the general sense in which the
realist hopes to account for empirical success in terms of the incremental
progress in theories and models as representations of unobservable reality.
Exemplar realism is at the same time global, in its attitude, and local, in
its action. By adopting the realist attitude one does not thereby take on the
responsibility to delineate the trust-worthy areas of all of science in one fell
swoop. Rather, the realist’s attitude is manifested locally. For example, the
realist might concern herself with the specific challenge from quantum phys-
ics, that despite their most impressive empirical success quantum theories
should be construed merely as predictive instruments. Here the realist looks
at the relevant details, working with the physicists (or those who work in
the relevant ‘foundations’), in order to explicate ways in which we can make
sense of the empirical success of quantum theories being due to quantum
theories latching onto reality. The fruits of that work of course need not
apply in any significant way to theories in other areas of science.
It is a necessary consequence of defending realism in this piecemeal way
that we must bite the bullet in response to the challenge that with respect
to most theories we do not really know what we are realists about. But
this is only problematic if one thinks that realism is a theory about the part
of the world we call ‘science’, a theory that tells us what there is in the
world, which theoretical terms refer, and so on. Realism as an attitude, as
I understand it, is fully compatible with such admission of our epistemic
limitations. The piecemeal approach to defending the appropriateness of
the attitude gives renewed meaning to the realist slogan divide et impera.
At the global meta-level exemplar realism only claims that copious in-
stances of empirical success of science are generally speaking accountable in
terms of theories latching onto reality. It leaves it to the exemplars to clarify
the different senses in which empirical success can be accountable in realist
terms. What does it take to be ‘accountable in realist terms’? Clearly this
is the critical notion here. One might find this notion unduly ambiguous
and vague. In particular, one might challenge the realist (i) to justify her
realist reading of the exemplars: by virtue of what do the exemplars fur-
nish realist explanations of past successes? And (ii), by virtue of what do
these realist readings of the exemplars avoid begging the question against
the anti-realist?
The first challenge asks the realist to provide a principled explication of
‘a realist explanation’ of the empirical success of a theory or model that is
clearly false—e.g. a past, now-rejected theory, or a highly idealised model,
say. Recipe realists think that this kind of explication can be done via a
realist recipe. Arguably the realist is thus pushed towards recipe realism
after all, in order to be able to justify her realist reading of the exemplars
(the justification being that they fit an independently motivated recipe). In
response, the exemplar realist can deny the need to introduce any recipes in
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order to get a handle on what it takes to account for the empirical successes
of false theories. Regarding past false theories, for example, whether or not
these are related to our current best theories in a way that furnishes a realist
or anti-realist explanation of a past theory’s empirical success is part and
parcel of scientific understanding of those theories. Thoroughly examined
cases that are well understood by the lights of science are exemplars that
wear their realist reading on their sleeves. Well-understood does not mean
‘simple’, of course: such exemplars can be complex and give rise to very
subtle senses in which theoretical correspondence between two theories can
be regarded as accounting for the empirical success of one in terms of the
other. The relationship between Newtonian gravity to Einstein’s general
theory of relativity is a well-studied case in point. Consider the in-depth
study of the reasons why, from the point of view of general relativity, New-
tonian theory of gravity made various novel predictions and can be used to
put a man on the moon. This captures well the way in which one can locally
account in a realist spirit for a past theory’s empirical success in extremely
rich, scientifically kosher terms, in comparison to which realist recipes pale.9
The second challenge accuses the realist of begging the question in ad-
opting a realist stance with respect to our current theories in presenting
exemplars of realist explanations of past successes. The force of this chal-
lenge depends on the overall dialectic. It must be acknowledged that exem-
plar realism does not even aim to provide a positive argument for realism
in and of itself. Rather, exemplar realism is a meta-level characterisation of
how one can (and should) go about defending global realist attitude against
more and less familiar challenges to realism. It is a good question where the
prima facie motivation for the realist attitude comes from, but this is not
something we have to pack into a statement of exemplar realism. But this
is no different from statements of recipe realism, which need not provide
a positive argument for realism either. In both cases something has to be
said in favour of adopting a realist attitude towards science at the outset,
whether it be a general plausibility consideration, or a more specific argu-
ment turning on some kind of inference to the best explanation, say. I want
to bracket these further issues here.
In closing I will consider one further worry about exemplar realism.
Without recipe-like constraints on what realist-explanations of empirical
success can look like—the worry goes—realism becomes vacuous. The worry
is that without recipe-like constraints it becomes impossible to have counter-
instances to realism: for any empirically successful past theory there are
some reasons why it is empirically successful; pointing to those reasons and
calling them an ‘exemplar’ cannot be enough, for otherwise anything goes.
9For relevant ‘foundational’ treatment of the relationship between Newtonian gravity
and general theory of relativity, see e.g. Malament (2012) and Fletcher (forthcoming).
Barrett (2008) and Saatsi (forthcoming b) make the connection to the realism debate.
12
In response, the exemplar realist agrees that there are constraints for
sure, but she insists that these need not take the form of a recipe. The realist
can accept (by the same token as above) that there can also be thoroughly
examined, well understood exemplars of non-realist accounts of empirical
success. The understanding of why these accounts are non-realist ones is
again part and parcel of proper scientific understanding of the theories and
models in question. The accounts can turn on interesting instances of un-
derdetermination or ‘mathematical coincidences’, for example, showing how
two different empirically successful scientific theories or models can have
little in common beyond their empirical predictions. (See the Kirchhoff case
from Saatsi and Vickers (2011), for example.) But such exemplars also have
a limited range of projectability, of course, and only speak against the global
realist attitude with respect to instances of theorising sufficiently similar to
them.
Overall, the global realist attitude regards as relatively rare—but by no
means non-existent—such instances of empirical success that ought to be
accounted in non-realist terms. The exemplar realist’s piecemeal evaluation
of the different cases makes room for a natural sense in which we can be
realists, globally speaking, about most of science. By virtue of this it is
much more robust than recipe-realism.
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